Structuralist and Cultural Domination Theories Meet Title VII:  Some Contemporary Influences by Chamallas, Martha
Michigan Law Review 
Volume 92 Issue 8 
1994 
Structuralist and Cultural Domination Theories Meet Title VII: 
Some Contemporary Influences 
Martha Chamallas 
University of Pittsburgh 
Follow this and additional works at: https://repository.law.umich.edu/mlr 
 Part of the Civil Rights and Discrimination Commons, Labor and Employment Law Commons, Law and 
Gender Commons, and the Legislation Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Martha Chamallas, Structuralist and Cultural Domination Theories Meet Title VII: Some Contemporary 
Influences, 92 MICH. L. REV. 2370 (1994). 
Available at: https://repository.law.umich.edu/mlr/vol92/iss8/3 
 
This Symposium is brought to you for free and open access by the Michigan Law Review at University of Michigan 
Law School Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in Michigan Law Review by an authorized 
editor of University of Michigan Law School Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact 
mlaw.repository@umich.edu. 
STRUCTURALIST AND CULTURAL 
DOMINATION THEORIES MEET TITLE 
VII: SOME CONTEMPORARY 
INFLUENCES 
Martha Chama/las* 
I often have trouble predicting how Title VII cases will come 
out. Like so many fields of law, Title VII law is dynamic, unsettled, 
and hotly contested. Particularly because the advance sheets seem 
to contain at least two divergent lines of cases - conservative and 
progressive - it is useful to speak in the plural when describing the 
visions of equality and discrimination embedded in the contempo-
rary caselaw. In many cases, equality seems narrowly conceived. 
To avoid charges of discrimination, employers need only provide 
formal access to jobs and occupations, freedom from overt bias 
stemming from race or gender prejudice, and an opportunity to as-
similate into the existing structures and processes of the workplace. 
A smaller group of cases, however, implicitly embraces broader vi-
sions of equality. Courts sometimes question the legitimacy of es-
tablished patterns of racial and gender stratification. They then 
reach beyond issues of access to uncover the links between access 
and the working culture and environment. 
This contest over the meaning of workplace equality is most vis-
ible in the scholarly trends that have developed over the thirty 
years since the passage of Title VII. In critical legal scholarship and 
in the social sciences, structuralist and cultural domination theories 
have emerged to challenge more conventional notions of equality 
centering on individual motivation and choice. These two newer 
approaches, I believe, already have had a discernible influence in 
the courts. Although such progressive incursions into Title VII 
have been limited and sporadic, they are enough to allow me to 
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earlier version of this essay, and to Nancy Reineke, Mary Tabor, Mark Briggs, Shauna 
Russell Shields, and Liza Diaz for their excellent research assistance. 
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speculate on the direction Title VII migh,t take if these two 
nondominant visions gained more prominence in the law. 
This essay first looks at three important theoretical approaches 
- motivational, 1 structural,2 and culturaP - that mark the schol-
arly discourses on workplace equality since 1965. The motivational 
or individual choice theory is well established and has dominated 
legal discourse throughout this period. I concentrate in this essay 
on the other two visions, dating structuralist accounts from the mid-
1970s and cultural domination theories from the mid-1980s. 
I then sketch the impact of these new visions on Title VII doc-
trine - noting cases in which plaintiffs have relied on structural or 
cultural accounts of discrimination to help articulate their theories 
of liability. The structuralist influence has surfaced in sexual stere-
otyping and sexual harassment cases in which expert testimony has 
been used to explain the distinctive problems women face in inten-
sively male-dominated workplaces.4 The impact of cultural domi-
nation theories can now be seen in a few sexual and racial 
harassment cases that challenge the choice of perspective from 
which the law evaluates a charge of offensive or hostile working 
environment.5 These structuralist and cultural domination influ-
ences are still at the margins of Title VII and have yet to be ade-
quately theorized in legal scholarship. The nondominant visions 
have had little or no impact in several core areas of the law, includ-
ing challenges to wage structures and occupational segregation, dis-
putes about affirmative action, the scope of available r~medies, and 
litigation over oppressive workplace rules and conditions other than 
violence or harassment. 
This essay begins to explore the implications of structuralist and 
cultural domination theory for Title VII doctrine. In the 1990s, the 
most pressing issue is no longer formal access; at least some mem-
bers of traditionally excluded groups have successfully integrated 
virtually every high-status occupation. The demographics of most 
organizations remain stratified, however, with disproportionate 
numbers of white men continuing to occupy the highest ranks, ac-
companied typically by token numbers of minorities and women.6 
1. See infra Part I. 
2. See infra Part II. 
3. See infra Part III. 
4. See infra Part IV. 
5. See infra Part V. 
6. See REYNOLDS FARLEY & WALTER R. ALLEN, THE COLOR LINE AND THE QUALITY 
OF LIFE IN AMERICA 271-73 (1987) (showing that in 1980about12% of black men compared 
with 25% of white men had jobs in the top two occupational categories; 50% of black men 
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Moreover, most women continue to work in low-paying, low-mobil-
ity, largely segregated jobs.7 Research of the last two decades sup-
ports the view that differences in the motivations or choices of 
individuals cannot adequately explain such persistent patterns of 
tokenism and segregation. Legal doctrine that does not address the 
impact of workplace structures, processes, and cultural norms on 
the lives of employees is incapable of responding to many of the 
"second generation" issues arising in Title VII disputes. 
!. MOTIVATIONAL EXPLANATIONS IN SOCIAL SCIENCE AND 
LEGAL DISCOURSE 
When Title VII was first enacted and throughout the 1960s, re-
search in the social sciences often focused on identifying psycholog-
ical characteristics of women and racial minorities that would 
explain why these groups did not achieve "success" in the work-
place. In its most simplified form, the motivational line of scholar-
ship asked what there was about outsiders - what were the traits, 
qualities, and dispositions - that prevented them from attaining 
positions of power and status. This inquiry directed attention to 
those who had been excluded and away from the actions of deci-
sionmakers. Posing the question in this way was apt to elicit a 
victim-blaming response that held the outsider responsible for his 
or her own predicament. 
A classic example of motivational research that was used to ex-
plain women's lack of representation in professional or high-status 
careers is Matina Homer's work on women's "fear of success" in 
the late 1960s.8 Horner argued that highly educated women often 
compared with 25% of white men worked at less-skilled, blue-collar jobs); BARBARA F. 
RESKIN & PATRICIA A. Roos, Joa QUEUES, GENDER QuEuES: ExPLAININO \VoMEN's 
INROADS INTO MALE OCCUPATIONS 5-6 (1990) ("Blacks, whether male or female, are less 
likely than whites to command well-paid managerial or professional jobs."). 
7. WOMEN'S BUREAU, U.S. DEPT. OF LABOR, 20 LEADING OCCUPATIONS OF EMPLOYED 
WoMEN, 1990 ANNUAL AVERAGES (Mar. 1991). Almost half of all women are employed in 
occupations that are at least 80% female; these women include, for example, librarians, 
health technicians, secretaries and typists, data-entry keyers, nurses, bank tellers and book-
keepers, telephone operators, sewers and stitchers, child-care workers, and dental assistants. 
WoMEN's WoRK, MEN'S WORK 7 (Barbara F. Reskin & Heidi I. Hartmann eds., 1986); see 
also Mary Ann Mason, Beyond Equal Opportunity: A New Vision for Women Workers, 6 
NoTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & Pua. PoLY. 393, 397 n.18 (1992) (reporting that according to 
Department of Commerce data published in 1986, 50.7% of all women work in only 19 of the 
503 occupational categories, all except 3 of the 19 occupations are 60% or more female, and 
15 of the 19 predominantly female occupations pay in the bottom half of the 421 ranked 
earnings); Deborah L. Rhode, Occupational Inequality, 1988 DuKE LJ. 1207, 1208-12 (dis-
cussing statistical patterns of segregation and wage inequity). 
8. Homer's research was first publicized in 1969 in an article in Psychology Today sum-
marizing the results of her dissertation project on women's fear of success. See Malina S. 
Horner, A Bright Woman ls Caught in a Double Bind, PsYCHOL. TooAY, Nov. 1969, at 36 
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undermine their own prospects for achievement in the outside 
world because of internal conflicts about their potential success. 
According to Horner, women's ambivalence about success arises 
both from their fears that intellectual achievement would result in a 
loss of femininity and from a deep-seated, unconscious association 
of success with loneliness, societal rejection, and despair.9 The con-
struct of the fear of success was hypothesized as a static property, 
acquired in early childhood and activated later to stifle career 
goals.10 Horner envisioned the fear of success as something that 
most women brought with them into college classrooms or the 
workplace and that could not readily be changed by the actions of 
employers or other institutional decisionmakers. The construct was 
particularly well suited to explain the phenomenon of tokenism, be-
cause only exceptional women who did not possess the fear of suc-
cess could be expected to integrate male domains. The focus on the 
inadequacy of the excluded group, moreover, meant that the crite-
ria and measures of success would not be .subjected to close 
scrutiny. 
The motivational explanation for women's exclusion from male-
dominated jobs struck a responsive chord in the 1960s, a time when 
highly educated women often found themselves working as home-
makers or secretaries. Homer's theory was taken up by research-
ers11 and the popular media12 to a degree that is rare for academic 
work. It has been described, for example, as "one of the most ex-
tensively studied psychological theories involving women's behav-
[hereinafter Homer, A Bright Woman]. She discusses her research more thoroughly in 
Matina S. Homer, Toward an Understanding of Achievement-Related Conflicts in Women, 28 
J. Soc. lssuES 157 (1972). 
9. Homer, A Bright Woman, supra note 8, at 36-38. 
10. Id. at 38. 
11. Homer's methodology and interpretation of data were scrutinized, criticized, and 
used as the basis for further studies. See, e.g., John Condry & Sharon Dyer, Fear of Success: 
Attribution of Cause to the Victim, 32 J. Soc. lssuES 63 (1976); Kimberley R. Gelbort & Jane 
L. Winer, Fear of Success and Fear of Failure: A Multitrait-Multimethod Validation Study, 4 J. 
PERSONALITY & Soc. PsYCHOL. 1009 (1985); Nancy M. Henley, Psychology and Gender, 11 
SIGNS 101 {1985); Michele A. Paludi, Psychometric Properties and Underlying Assumptions of 
Four Objective Measures of Fear of Success, 10 Sex RoLES 765 {1984); David Tresemer, Do 
Women Fear Success?, 1 S1GNS 863 {1976); Peter J. Weston & Martha T. Mednick, Race, 
Social Class and the Motive to Avoid Success in Women, 1 J. CRoss-CuLTURAL PsYCHOL. 283 
(1970). 
12. Colette Dowling's 1981 bestseller capitalized on the popularity of Homer's thesis and 
used the fear of success to support the notion that women have a hidden fear of indepen-
dence. See CoLETIE DowLJNG, THE CINDERELLA COMPLEX: WOMEN'S HIDDEN FEAR OF 
INDEPENDENCE 170-79 (1981). 
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ior"13 and as a "proven personality trait .... [that] has worked its 
way into standard sources of gospel."14 
Perhaps the most important feature of Homer's line of motiva-
tional research was its focus on the psychology of individual 
women, locating the origin of the problem in the early socialization 
of women. The implication of Homer's research was that success is 
within the reach of individual women, if only their psychological 
makeup would allow them to attain it. Further, because patterns of 
women's psychological development are unlikely to change quickly, 
it was reasonable to expect sexual integration of jobs to proceed 
very slowly. The practical implications of the motivational theory 
posed no substantial threat to existing organizations or professions. 
Congruent with Homer's own career as president of Radcliffe Col-
lege, 15 the best antidote for fear of success promised to be the coun-
seling of individual women at elite schools to help them reevaluate 
their career aspirations. 
The motivational orientation continues to influence contempo-
rary scholarship on workplace equality and probably dominates the 
discourse in the popular culture. It is most prominent in discussions 
about women and work, but it also surfaces in analyses of the situa-
tion of racial minorities. Randall Kennedy's analysis of the 
demographics of the legal academy, for example, relies in part on a 
fear-of-failure theory to explain the small percentage of black aca-
demics, especially at elite institutions.16 Reminiscent of Horner, 
Kennedy speculates that such fear may cause black scholars "to en-
gage in various strategies of avoidance: for example, exempting 
themselves from the risks of failure by refusing to compete on the 
same terms as whites or refraining from investing themselves 
wholeheartedly in their careers."17 
In its contemporary version in the mass media, the motivational 
explanation for women's occupational status has tended to shift 
from fear of success and fear of loss of femininity to an emphasis on 
women's choice to subordinate their careers to accommodate fam-
13. Mary R. Walsh, Do Women Fear Success?, in THE PSYCHOLOGY OF WOMEN 165, 165 
(Mary R. Walsh ed., 1987). 
14. Paludi, supra note 11, at 766. 
15. Horner was appointed president of Radcliffe College in 1972 and served in that ca-
pacity for 17 years. See Vivian Gornick, Why Radcliffe women are afraid of success, N.Y. 
TIMES, Jan. 14, 1973, § 6 (Magazine), at 10; Zoe Ingalls, New President Challenged to Define 
Radcliffe's 'Fugitive Nature,' CHRON. HIGHER Eouc., Feb. 14, 1990, at A3. 
16. See Randall L. Kennedy, Racial Critiques of Legal Academia, 102 HARV. L. REV. 
1745 (1989). 
17. Id. at 1769. 
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ily obligations. Tokenism and segregation is now typically ex-
plained by women's lack of geographic mobility, their need to 
interrupt careers to have children, and their desire to spend less 
time at work - the "mommy track."18 Like the earlier motiva-
tional explanations, however, the central feature of these "family 
conflict" theories of women's occupational status was to locate the 
principal cause of tokenism and segregation in the choices that indi-
vidual women make and to imply that women's psychology is highly 
relevant to those choices. 
Motivational explanations have also been prominent in the rhet-
oric and reasoning of courts deciding Title VII cases, exerting a sig-
nificant influence on how courts view patterns of segregation and 
tokenism. The most well-established theory of liability - the the-
ory of intentional disparate treatment - is premised on the motiva-
tion of individuals. Under the disparate treatment theory, courts 
conceptualize discrimination as the outcome of discrete, biased acts 
of individuals. Statistical proof of patterns of segregation and ex-
clusion do not as such constitute violations of the law for these 
courts. Rather, they require courts to interpret the origins of those 
patterns. The critical question is whether to draw from these pat-
terns an inference of discriminatory motivation on the part of the 
employer or to infer that the patterns result from choices made by 
members of the underrepresented groups themselves. 
Vicki Schultz's pathbreaking scholarship on the judicial treat-
ment of the "lack-of-interest" defense in Title VII cases19 demon-
strates the hold that motivational explanations have had on the 
thinking of the courts. Schultz contends that the courts' willingness 
18. Felice Schwartz's views, for example, bear a strong resemblance to Homer's. See 
Felice N. Schwartz, Management Women and the New Facts of Life, HARV. Bus. REv., Jan.-
Feb. 1989, at 65. Schwartz hypothesizes that women in management positions fall into two 
categories - career-primary women and career-and-family women - not unlike the women 
with and without fear of success. Id. at 68. For the more traditional women - that is, those 
who are career-and-family minded - Schwartz argues that management should create a 
more relaxed, flexible, and lower-paid working schedule to accommodate their family con-
flicts. Id. at 70-72. Male managers in Schwartz's schema are presumed to be career-primary 
in their motivation. Id. at 67. Schwartz's views became popularized as advocating the 
"mommy track." See Felice N. Schwartz, The "Mommy Track" Isn't Anti-Woman, N.Y. 
TIMES, Mar. 8, 1989, at A18; Tamar Lewin, "Mommy Career Track" Sets Off a Furor, N.Y. 
TIMES, Mar. 8, 1989, at A18; see also Suzannah B. Wilson, Note, Eliminating Sex Discrimina-
tion in the Legal Profession: The Keys to Widespread Social Reform, 67 IND. LJ. 817, 843-47 
& nn. 193-220 (1992) (collecting references). 
19. Vicki Schultz, Telling Stories About Women and Work: Judicial Interpretations of Sex 
Segregation in the Workplace in Title VII Cases Raising the Lack of Interest Argument, 103 
HARV. L. REv. 1749 (1990); Vicki Schultz & Stephen Petterson, Race, Gender, Work, and 
Choice: An Empirical Study of the Lack of Interest Defense in Title VII Cases Challenging 
Jpb Segregation, 59 U. Cm. L. REv. 1073 (1993). 
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to accept a lack-of-interest argument in the controversial case of 
EEOC v. Sears, Roebuck & Co.20 was not unusual. 
Sears involved a challenge to workplace segregation. The claim 
was that Sears had discriminated against women by maintaining a 
gender-stratified sales force, with men dominating the higher-paid, 
commissioned sales jobs and women relegated to the lower-paid, 
noncommissioned sales work.21 The court rejected the EEOC's 
contention that the workforce statistics were highly probative of sex 
discrimination. Sears persuaded the court that the pattern could be 
attributed to women's own preferences for more noncompetitive 
work in what was characterized as a feminine, friendly 
environment.22 
To support her view that the ruling in Sears was not atypical, 
Schultz analyzed sex discrimination cases decided between 1972 
and 1989 that raised the lack-of-interest defense. She found that in 
almost half of the cases, courts concluded that sex segregation was 
attributable to women's own work preferences.23 As Schultz ex-
plains it, the dominant narrative that emerges from these cases is of 
a world in which employees form their preferences for certain types 
of jobs and occupations before they enter the labor force.24 The 
conservative version of the story posits that, because of biology or 
sex-role socialization, women tend to prefer female or feminine 
jobs and simply are not interested in nontraditional work, despite 
its greater economic rewards.25 The liberal version of the story re-
sists assigning an automatic preference for certain types of jobs 
based on an employee's gender,26 but like the conservative version, 
the liberal account accepts the causal connection between the pref-
erences of individual employees and the resulting gender composi-
tion of jobs and occupations.27 What is missing from both versions 
is the role played by workplace structures, processes, and ideologies 
in shaping or constituting workers' preferences. Schultz theorizes 
that both liberal and conservative courts tend to operate within a 
20. 628 F. Supp. 1264 (N.D. III. 1986), affd., 839 F.2d 302 (7th Cir. 1988). For a discussion 
of the case, see Ruth Milkman, Women's History and the Sears Case, 12 FEMINIST STUD. 375 
{1986). 
21. 628 F. Supp. at 1278. 
22. 628 F. Supp. at 1305-15, 1326-27. 
23. Schultz, supra note 19, at 1777. 
24. See id. at 1800. 
25. Id. at 1800-05. 
26. Id. at 1806-14. 
27. Id. at 1807-08. 
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motivational framework when they approach the critical issue of 
sexual segregation in the workplace.28 
In race discrimination cases raising the lack-of-interest defense, 
Schultz has again documented the continuing importance of moti-
vational explanations in shaping Title VII doctrine. The pattern 
Schultz uncovers in race discrimination cases differs from that in 
sex discrimination cases. Between 1967 and 1977, the ten-year pe-
riod immediately following enactment of Title VII, the courts most 
often rejected the lack-of-interest defense and seemed to assume 
that racial segregation was a product of labor market inequalities.29 
This more plaintiff-oriented phase of Title VII litigation ended in 
the late 1970s. In the more recent era, Schultz has found that moti-
vational explanations are an important influence in racial segrega-
tion cases. Since 1977, courts have been more apt to attribute racial 
segregation to the choices of minority workers.30 The motivational 
account as it is expressed in racial segregation cases posits that mi-
norities choose low-paying jobs because they "lack the initiative to 
pursue better alternatives."31 Courts trace the paradox of African 
Americans' choosing to work at low-paying, low-mobility jobs to 
internal, psychological responses such as a different cultural atti-
tude toward work, lack of discipline, or lack of commitment. 
Although the script differs, the sex and race narratives share a 
basic motivational framework. In each, there is a search for differ-
ence, focusing on some intrinsic quality of the applicant or em-
ployee, whether it is styled "motivation," "interest," or 
"preference." This difference is then used to explain why members 
of the disadvantaged group do not have the same measure of suc-
cess as the privileged group. There may be disputes about whether 
the difference really exists, but courts rarely ask whether the differ-
ence justifies imposing a disadvantage on the employee or whether 
the difference is partly attributable to the employer. In the motiva-
tional account, responsibility lies with the individual worker; the 
employer is required only to measure or judge each worker even-
handedly using conventional standards. 
As I have described it, the motivational orientation is so deeply 
embedded in discussions of workplace equality and discrimination 
that it is often invisible. As with most dominant paradigms, the 
28. Id. at 1800. 
29. Schultz & Petterson, supra note 19, at 1098; see also Schultz, supra note 19, at 1771-
75. 
30. Schultz & Petterson, supra note 19, at 1098. 
31. Id. at 1080. 
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motivational orientation gains its power from being accepted im-
plicitly, rarely being subjected to close scrutiny. 
II. STRUCTURALIST THEORY AND WORKPLACE EQUALITY 
By the mid-1970s, the psychological model of Horner and others 
was challenged by research that tended to blame "the system" 
rather than individuals and sought explanations for racial and sex-
ual imbalances in the structures of institutions. One of the most 
prominent structuralist scholars of this era was Rosabeth Moss 
Kanter.32 Her famous ethnology of a large firm - Men and 
Women of the Corporation33 - focused on the dynamics of segre-
gation and tokenism as they affect women in the corporation. 
Kanter's structuralism started from the premise that "the job makes 
the person,"34 such that, for example, employees with little oppor-
tunity to advance will respond by lowering their aspirations and by 
seeking satisfaction outside the job. The structuralist orientation 
also located discrimination outside the minds of individuals who 
make discrete decisions. Kanter reframed and enlarged the concept 
of discrimination to make it a byproduct of structure, "a conse-
quence of organizational pressures as much as individual 
prejudice. "35 
Kanter described her brand of structuralism as an "intermediate 
level analysis"36 that, at the time Kanter wrote, was lacking in much 
of the research about women and work. Until the 1970s, theorists 
had concentrated either on "highly macroscopic" trends, like track-
ing labor force participation rates of women, or, like Horner, on 
"very microscopic" discussions about women's individual psychol-
ogy or socialization.37 Acknowledging an intellectual debt to femi-
32. Kanter was the first woman to receive a Ph.D. in social psychology from Michigan 
and later taught in Yale's sociology department. She was a diversity consultant to businesses 
and an editor of the Harvard Business Review. See Susanne Lawrence, Rosabeth Moss 
Kanter: Professor of Entrepreneurship and Innovation, Harvard Business School, 18 PERSON· 
NEL MGMT., Sept. 1986, at 22; Susan McHenry, Rosabeth Moss Kanter, Ms., Jan. 1985, at 62; 
Joan Vennochi, What They Don't Teach You at the Harvard Business School, WORKING 
WOMAN, Feb. 1993, at 52. 
33. ROSABETH M. KANTER, MEN AND WOMEN OF THE CORPORATION (1977). Kanter's 
influence has been profound in the social sciences. Even contemporary critics of Kanter use 
her scholarship as the reference point for their empirical studies. See, e.g., ROBIN J. ELY, 
ORGANIZATIONAL DEMOGRAPHICS AND WOMEN'S GENDER IDENTITY AT WORK (John F. 
Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University, Faculty Research Working Paper Se· 
ries, 1993); Janice D. Yoder, Rethinking Tokenism: Looking Beyond Numbers, 5 GENDER & 
SoCY. 178 (1991). 
34. KANTER, supra note 33, at 9. 
35. Id. 
36. Id. at xiii. 
37. Id. 
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nism,38 Kanter sought to explain how organizational structures 
constrain and empower individuals to act. Much of her work was 
devoted to showing the organizational or political aspect of what 
had formerly been accepted as personal or private. The structural-
ist account of the workplace is that of a highly politicized site where 
informal encounters often have more importance than formal meet-
ings - where success on the job is measured more by peer accept-
ance than by competence in performing the tasks found in the 
formal job description.39 
Numbers are very important in structuralist analyses of the 
workplace. A major theme of Kanter's work is the self-perpetuat-
ing nature of tokenism.4° Kanter investigated what she called the 
"skewed" group, in which there is a large predominance of men -
roughly eighty-five percent or more.41 She believed that the men in 
skewed groups typically control the work culture, such that it is fair 
to describe the men as "dominants" and the women as "tokens;"42 
Stereotyping is also likely to flourish in skewed settings that lack a 
critical mass of women.43 , 
This focus on the skewed group is historically significant; in the 
middle to late 1970s, women had begun to enter nontraditional 
jobs. Many women who were not in women's fields, such as nursing 
or teaching, were likely to find themselves in such skewed settings. 
The tipping point for Kanter is located somewhere between fifteen 
and thirty-five percent, in groups she described as "tilted."44 In 
these tilted groups, the hypothesis is that tokens will become "mi-
norities" and will be able to form coalitions and engage in other 
effective strategies to influence the culture of the organization.45 
Although Kanter regarded her theory as applicable to any minority 
group in the workplace,46 it most directly addressed the predica-
ment of women - and perhaps only white women - because 
women are the only minority group large enough to reach the per-
centages Kanter suggested for moving beyond token status. 
38. Id. 
39. For a contemporary application of structuralist theory to the dynamics of tokenism in 
academia, see Paula Dressel et al., The Dynamics of Homosocial Reproduction in Academic 
Institlltions, 2 AM. U. J. GENDER & L. 37 (1994). 
40. See KANTER, supra note 33, at 210, 241-42, 249. 
41. Id. at 208. 
42. Id. 
43. Id. at 230. 
44. Id. at 209. 
45. Id. 
46. See id. at 207. 
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In the structuralist account, the demographics of the workplace 
signal not only which groups exercise control but also how employ-
ees from nondominant groups are likely to be regarded and evalu-
ated. Stereotyping is a central dynamic encompassing more than a 
set of overbroad generalizations attached to certain groups. One 
very important theme in Kanter's work, for example, is her explica-
tion of the social construction of tokens in the workplace.47 Her 
research contested the notion that stereotypes of a group would 
break down in the face of the counterexample of a real person who 
did not fit the mold. Instead, in a skewed group it often is easier to 
make the person fit the generalization about the group than to 
change the generalization.48 Professional women in the corporation 
are individually noticed; people know their names and watch their 
actions. But because women are known primarily because of their 
sex, they are not known as individuals. The phenomenon of selec-
tive perception means that women are noticed and rated on a scale 
for women only, with focus on their style of dress, their appearance, 
their bodies, their social graces, and other nonability traits.49 
Selective perception combined with typecasting can distort 
everyday encounters with women at work. The behavior of token 
women is apt to be assimilated and reduced to patterns associated 
with women outside the workplace. Women are trapped into roles: 
they can be likened to a mother, a little sister (or pet), or a sexual 
object (seductress, mistress), or cast as a militant (iron maiden, vir-
gin aunt). Each of these role traps is an obstacle to women's ad-
vancement. Mothers might be appreciated for their emotional 
work, but emotional work is not highly valued in the corporate 
arena. Little sisters are not taken seriously enough to be consid-
ered leaders. Because men tend to compete for the attention of a 
sexual object, her presence is thought to cause divisions. The mili-
tant is looked upon with suspicion from a distance and left to man-
age on her own.so 
The structuralist analysis of typecasting emphasizes its dynamic, 
interactive nature. There is a "feedback loop" between the domi-
nant group's perception of the token and the token's behavior. It is 
often easier for token women to gain an "instant identity" by con-
forming to one of the preexisting stereotypes.st Even those who 
47. See id. at 230-36. 
48. Id. at 230-31. 
49. Id. at 216-17. 
50. Id. at 233-37. 
51. Id. at 211. 
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resist the feminine stereotypes can be placed into a position of con-
tinual alertness to their own behavior, to make sure they do not 
unwittingly exhibit stereotypically feminine traits.52 Either strategy 
results in a measure of self-distortion, with the token holding back 
whatever fits or does not fit into the preconceived roles. In this 
way, stereotyping and typecasting - processes over which the em-
ployer has some measure of control - actually shape the behavior 
and identity of employees. ", 
The implication of the structuralist position is that "organiza-
tions - not people - [have] to change"53 to break down the pat-
terns of tokenism and segregation. Kanter's prescription for change 
was batch or cluster hiring: hire more than one woman at a time 
and concentrate them, rather than scatter them, throughout the or-
ganization. 54 This "critical mass" strategy was thought to maximize 
women's potential to influence the culture in their specific working 
groups. The strategy also implied that if women are involved in 
making decisions about women, that will make a difference. Stere-
otyping is most prevalent when male-only committees sit in judg-
ment of women. 
The structuralist orientation represented a clear alternative to 
the motivational orientation that had dominated the discourse prior 
to the 1970s. From the lens of organizational structure, it was possi-
ble to reconsider prior research - like that of Matina Homer - in 
a less victim-blaming fashion, while offering more· interventionist 
strategies for change. For example, Kanter reinterpreted Homer's 
research to reveal the token woman's fear of visibility, rather than a 
more generalized fear of success among women.55 Kanter's re-
search had shown that men resent the visibility of a token woman 
and often retaliate if they think that a woman is trading on her visi-
bility to get ahead. When tokens become "stars," they risk intense 
negative reaction from their professional peers and are likely to be 
abandoned the first time they encounter problems.56 A common 
response among token women is to try to limit their visibility, to 
avoid taking risks, and to play a behind-the-scenes role. In the 
structuralist account, the fear of success was reframed to be situa-
tional and amenable to change; it was assumed that women's fears 
52. Id. at '2:37. 
53. Id. at 261. 
54. Id. at 282. 
55. See id. at 221; see also Rosabeth M. Kanter, Reflections of Women and the Legal 
Profession: A Sociological Perspective, 1 HARV. WoMEN's L.J. l, 13 {1978). 
56. KANTER, supra note 33, at 218. 
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would lessen as the risk of retaliation against successful women 
lessened. 
Perhaps the most important contribution of the structuralist ap-
proach is its ability to explain difference without naturalizing it. 
Kanter, for example, challenged the notion that gender was special 
by offering a more gender-neutral theory premised on relative num-
bers. One of her objectives was to demonstrate that roles and situa-
tions, rather than "verifiable 'sex differences,' "57 are better 
predictors of behavior and performance at work. Disputing the 
existence of essential sex differences, however, does not mean that 
gender in the workplace is irrelevant. Instead, the structuralist ac-
count explains how even workers with the same job title can have 
dramatically different work experiences; how, for example, token 
women perform their jobs under different "public and symbolic" 
conditions than their male peers.ss 
Because the structuralist account emphasizes the internal dy-
namics of the organizations, it is not grounded in the common as-
sumption that women's maternal and sexual roles determine their 
career aspirations and the way they function at work. Theories 
such as Homer's trade on women's "natural role" as mothers and 
imply that women are psychologically comfortable only in domestic 
situations. The structuralist severing of the family-work axis means 
that subordination in the family need not inevitably be replicated in 
the workplace. 
As an intellectual force, structuralism found its way into legal 
discourse through Catharine MacKinnon's work on sexual harass-
ment. Her influential text, Sexual Harassment of Working 
Women, 59 published in 1979, reframed sexual harassment as a struc-
tural abuse that was a byproduct of women's inferior position in the 
workplace. MacKinnon's analysis deprivatized the injury of sexual 
harassment. She sought to dispel the commonly held view that on-
the-job harassment is a personal matter produced by sexual attrac-
tion or office flirtation. 
Connecting sex segregation with harassment, MacKinnon ar-
gued that sexual harassment was facilitated by two structural forces: 
horizontal segregation, which meant that vast numbers of women 
were employed in pink-collar, feminized jobs;60 and tokenism, 
which severely limited the number of women working in male-
57. Id. at xiii. 
58. Id. at 212. 
59. CATHARINE A. MACKINNON, SEXUAL HARASSMENT OF WORKING WOMEN (1979). 
60. Id. at 9. 
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defined jobs.61 For MacKinnon, the capacity to be sexually 
harassed was an informal job qualification for women in feminized 
jobs. Drawing on Kanter and other sociologists, MacKinnon de-
scribed secretarial work as "sex-defined" work in which secretaries 
are required to be deferential, pleasing, supportive, wifelike, recep-
tive, and willing to project sexual availability, even if they have no 
desire for sexual attention from men at work.62 Particularly be-
cause women in female-dominated jobs were most likely to have 
male supervisors,63 the structure of the workplace replicated and 
reinforced a gender hierarchy that placed women in the double 
birid of needing to appear compliant while successfully resisting 
sexual overtures. For token women in male-dominated jobs, 
MacKinnon theorized that they were singled out for harassment be-
cause they were highly visible, marked by their sex, and an easy 
target for male co-workers who resented the invasion of their 
territory.64 
Most recently, Vicki Schultz and Elvia Arriola have examined 
how, in the last two decades, sexual harassment has limited the 
number of women in blue-collar jobs and other nontraditional oc-
cupations. Arriola's study of pioneer female construction workers 
in New York City, for example, demonstrated how virulent harass-
ment, often combined with employers' failure to train and co-work-
ers' sabotage of women's work performance, can make it difficult 
for even highly motivated women to remain in hostile environ-
ments. 65 Using a version of the structuralist feedback loop, Schultz 
explicated the connection between on-the-job harassment and 
women's aspirations for nonsegregated work.66 She asserted that 
women are reluctant to apply for masculine jobs because they real-
ize that "behind the symbolism of masculinized job descriptions lies 
a very real force: the power of men to harass, belittle, ostracize, 
dismiss, marginalize, discard, and just plain hurt them as 
workers. "67 
Structuralist scholars portray segregation and tokenism as resili-
ent forces, not capable of breaking down simply because some indi.:. 
61. Id. 
62. See id. at 18-23. 
63. MacKinnon describes this structural feature as "vertical stratification." Id. at 12-13. 
64. See id. at 40. 
65. Elvia R. Arriola, "What's the Big Deal?" Women in the New York City Construction 
Industry and Sexual Harassment Law, 1970-1985, 22 CoLUM. HuM. Rrs. L. REv. 21 (1990). 
66. Schultz, supra note 19, at 1833-39. 
67. Id. at 1838. 
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victuals change their attitudes or aspirations. But the scholarship of 
Kanter, MacKinnon, Schultz, and other structuralists also has an 
activist quality; it is designed to show that the status quo is not inev-
itable and to suggest what measures can be taken to bring about 
change. 
From an antidiscrimination law perspective, moreover, struc-
turalism is an optimistic theory because it opens up possibilities for 
effective legal intervention. Under Title VII, the principal defend-
ant is the organization; employers, not individual supervisors or co-
employees, are typically held liable. 68 Courts are thus called upon 
to decide whether it is fair to hold the employer responsible and 
whether a remedy directed against the employer will actually work 
to increase opportunities for protected groups. The structuralist ac-
count provides a solid rationale for holding employers accountable 
because it traces the origin of segregative patterns to the 
demographics of the workplace and to the opportunity structures 
within which employees make choices. An employer's hiring deci-
sions, for example, take on an interactive quality; when an em-
ployer hires a particular applicant, the employer does not simply 
recognize the applicant's abilities or talents but, over time, actively 
shapes the new employee's behavior and contributes to the em-
ployee's success or failure. In the structuralist account, the individ-
ual employee is an active agent who makes strategic choices within 
constraints and enabling structures provided by the employer. The 
employer and the employee each share responsibility for the 
results. 
The activist stance and the optimism of several of the structural 
scholars, however, were hard to sustain in light of the dramatic turn 
to the right in U.S. politics in the 1980s. The political climate meant 
that the prospects for significant structural changes were remote. 
The problems persisted while the enthusiasm for affirmative action 
and restructuring of the workplace abated. During this period, pro-
fessional women complained of their inability to break through the 
"glass ceiling,"69 an invisible but impenetrable barrier that pre-
vented women from attaining those positions that they were close 
68. Title VII imposes liability on an "employer," defined as an entity employing 15 or 
more persons and including any "agent" of the employer. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b) (1988). Su-
pervisors who qualify as "agents" may also be individually liable for Title VII violations in 
certain situations. See BARBARA LINDEMANN & DAVID D. KADUE, SEXUAL HARASSMENT 
IN EMPLOYMENT LAW 515-21 (1992). 
69. See Patricia M. Wald, Breaking the Glass Ceiling, 16 HuM. RTS. 40 (1989). The Civil 
Rights Act of 1991 established a Glass Ceiling Commission to explore artificial barriers to 
women's career advancement. Glass Ceiling Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, tit. II, 105 
Stat. 1081-87 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (Supp. III 1991)). 
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enough to see. Women in clerical positions described their lack of 
mobility as the "sticky floor" syndrome.70 Susan Faludi's book 
Backlash, 11 which elaborately documented the resistance in the 
1980s to women's initiatives for independence begun in the 1970s, 
generated an intense response from women. Most recently, Ellis 
Cose's The Rage of a Privileged Class72 struck a responsive chord 
among African-American professionals. Cose detailed how at a 
time when most white Americans believe that racism has ended or 
has greatly subsided, patterns of racial segregation and tokenism 
continue to limit opportunities for even the most elite minorities. 
With this growing realization of the tenacity of workplace inequal-
ity, a more somber scholarship emphasizing ideological barriers de-
veloped in the mid-1980s - a scholarship that supplements, 
complements, and to a degree challenges the work done by the 
structuralists. 
Ill. CULTURAL DOMINATION THEORY AND THE CONTAINMENT 
OF EQUALITY 
The newest orientation to address workplace equality issues -
the cultural domination approach - has been most thoroughly de-
veloped by critical race and feminist legal scholars. As embodied in 
the work of Derrick Bell,73 cultural domination theory posits that 
dominant groups will find various ways to maintain their position in 
society. A major theme of this scholarship is that oppression can be 
reproduced and progress is not inevitable.74 Cultural domination 
theorists are alert to the prospect that racial and gender hierarchies 
may remain intact, even if specific structures or forms of oppression 
change. In the cultural domination account, even policies such as 
affirmative action, designed to integrate the workplace, can back-
fire if they fail to address "culturally ingrained responses" that deny 
70. See Barbara P. Noble, At Work: And Now the 'Sticky Floor,' N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 22, 
1992, § 3 (Business), at 23 (discussing an empirical study by Prof. Catherine White Berheide). 
71. SUSAN FALUDI, BACKLASH: THE UNDECLARED WAR AGAINST AMERICAN WOMEN 
(1991). 
72. ELUs CosE, THE RAGE OF A PRIVILEGED CLASS (1993). 
73. His two major books are DERRICK BELL, AND WE ARE NoT SAVED: THE ELUSIVE 
QuEST FOR RACIAL JUSTICE (1987) [hereinafter BELL, AND WE ARE NoT SAVED], and 
DERRICK BELL, FACES AT THE BOTTOM OF THE WELL: THE PERMANENCE OF RACISM 
(1992). 
74. For a description of some of the major features of contemporary critical race scholar-
ship, see Charles R. Lawrence III, et al., Introduction to MARI J. MATSUDA ET AL., WoROs 
THAT WOUND: CRmcAL RACE THEORY, AssAULTIVE SPEECH, AND THE F1RST AMEND-
MENT 1, 6-7 (1993). 
2386 Michigan Law Review (Vol. 92:2370 
legitimacy to any situation in which white men are not in a "clearly 
dominant role. "75 
Cultural domination theorists argue that discrimination operates 
at the unconscious level, such that even members of the minority 
groups do not escape the effects of the dominant ideology. In this 
vein, for example, Charles Lawrence has described racism as a sys-
tem of thought and action that is 
much more complex than either the conscious conspiracy of a power 
elite or the simple delusion of a few ignorant bigots. It is a part of our 
common historical experience and, therefore, a part of our culture. It 
arises from the assumptions we have learned to make about the 
world, ourselves, and others as well as from the patterns of our funda-
mental social activities.76 
Derrick Bell embraced this cultural definition of racism in his 
influential "Chronicle of the De Vine Gift," concerning "the unspo-
ken limits on affirmative action."77 Bell's chronicle uncovers ape-
culiarly contemporary form of tokenism - a phenomenon I call 
"containment." In the tale, Geneva Crenshaw is the only black 
professor at a major law school. She explains that she had become 
increasingly overloaded with doing the extra work that comes with 
being a token - counseling students, serving on endless commit-
tees, being called on to help when there is a racial crisis. She had 
watched as the faculty rejected subsequent minority candidates as 
unqualified, even some with credentials better than her own. The 
De Vine gift came in the form of superqualified minority candidates 
who magically became available to fill the curricular and other 
needs of the school.7s 
By the time there were six minority faculty, diverse in ethnicity 
and gender, the law school seemed poised to go beyond tokenism. 
The moment of insight occurred, however, when the faculty refused 
to hire the exceptionally talented Seventh Candidate. The Dean 
explained that just as Howard University wished to stay a black in-
stitution, the law school wished to maintain its image as a white 
75. See BELL, AND WE ARE NoT SAVED, supra note 73, at 157. 
76. Charles R. Lawrence III, The Id, the Ego, and Equal Protection: Reckoning with Un-
conscious Racism, 39 STAN. L. REV. 317, 330 (1987); see also BELL, AND WE ARE NoT 
SAVED, supra note 73, at 4-5 (quoting the same passage). 
77. The chronicle was first published in Derrick Bell, The Supreme Court, 1984 Term-
Foreword: The Civil Rights Chronicles, 99 HARV. L. REV. 4, 39-57 (1985), under the title 
"The Chronicle of the De Vine Gift." The chronicle is included in BELL, AND WE ARE NoT 
SAVED, supra note 73, at 140-61, as a chapter entitled "The Unspoken Limit on Affirmative 
Action." 
78. BELL, AND WE ARE NoT SAVED, supra note 73, at 142. 
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school and could not afford to go higher than twenty-five percent in 
representation of racial minorities.79 
Bell intentionally leaves the moral of the chronicle open-ended. 
I read it as embodying a theory of tokenism that places special em-
phasis on cultural domination. Racial and gender diversity are con-
tained before they have the effect of changing the culture of the law 
school. Bell locates the source of the resistance to diversity -
whether to the first or to the seventh candidate - in the uncon-
scious desire to preserve the white racial identity of the school.so 
Tue preference for white domination is the unspoken limit on af-
firmative action. Tue somber message implicit in cultural domina-
tion theory is that institutions will resist change simply because they 
cannot believe that high quality is consistent with diversity. Tue 
cultural explanation is alert to numbers, particularly as it focuses on 
the question of why the dominant group feels threatened and resists 
the introduction of a critical mass of minorities in the workplace. 
But unlike Kanter, Bell does not assume that the problem lies 
mainly in the numbers. Hiring more women or more minorities 
may not be enough. In the cultural account, the relationship be-
tween numbers and ideological impact is not symmetrical. There is 
no guarantee that stereotypes and negative images about others will 
disappear once their representation reaches beyond a certain point. 
Under Bell's cultural domination theory, institutions follow a 
policy of containment - both ideologically and in terms of num-
bers - by adopting culturally slanted notions of merit and, when 
necessary, by changing the definition of merit to assure that the 
white racial status of the institution is maintained.81 Cultural domi-
nation theorists tend to regard "merit" as a moving target. When 
there is integration in one sector - for example, law school admis-
sions - it is likely that another credential that far fewer minorities 
or women possess - for example, a Ph.D. in economics or a 
Rhodes scholarship - will emerge as the new indicator of excel-
lence. This shift rarely results from a conscious conspiracy among 
those in power to select the standard with the most exclusionary 
impact. It is rather the cultural association of whiteness (or male-
ness) with merit and value that leads people to believe that exclu-
sionary sites are the most prestigious. Cultural domination theory, 
for example, explains the phenomenon of job shifting - the lower-
ing in prestige when a particular job or occupation shifts over time 
79. Id. at 144. 
80. See id. at 158. 
81. See id. at 145. 
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from male-dominated to female-dominated, such as the job of sec-
retary or bank teller.82 It also supports a major tenet of the compa-
rable worth campaign: that men's work is valued more highly than 
women's work, regardless of the inherent tasks of the job.83 
The importance placed on ideological containment in the cul-
tural domination analysis helps to explain the contemporary predic-
ament of institutions that seem to incorporate women and other 
outsiders without changing the values of the institution. A dramatic 
example of such resistance to change in academia can be seen in 
Carolyn Heilbrun's public struggle with Columbia University.84 
Heilbrun is an esteemed writer who pioneered the field of women's 
biography and autobiography.85 Although she received many of 
the formal markers of prestige - she held an endowed chair in the 
English department and was past president of the Modern Lan-
guage Association - Heilbrun resigned her academic post in pro-
test, claiming that Columbia denied her the informal power that 
usually accompanies high rank. According to Heilbrun, Columbia's 
hostility to feminism meant that Heilbrun's sponsorship of graduate 
students and junior faculty had little effect. Her outspokenness on 
women's issues caused her colleagues to shun her and discount the 
importance of her work. At that time, Columbia's English depart-
ment was not wholly lacking in diversity, with seven of the thirty-
one tenured faculty being women. The condition that precipitated 
Heilbrun's protest was not simply the scarcity of women but the 
containment of feminism. Heilbrun's activism challenged the iden-
tity of the institution - an identity that Heilbrun claimed was fun-
damentally male. 
82. See MACKINNON, supra note 59, at 11-12; RESKIN & Roos, supra note 6, at 11-15; 
Ruth G. Blumrosen, Wage Discrimination, Job Segregation, and Title VII of the Civil Rights 
Act of 1964, 12 U. MICH. J.L. REF. 397, 415-20 (1979); Martha Chamallas, Exploring the 
"Entire Spectrum" of Disparate Treatment Under Title VII: Rules Governing Predominately 
Female Jobs, 1984 U. ILL. L. REV. 1, 25-27. 
83. For a sample of the voluminous literature on comparable worth, see LINDA M. BLUM, 
BE1WEEN FEMINISM AND LABOR: THE SIGNIFICANCE OF THE COMPARABLE WORTH MOVE· 
MENT (1991); COMPARABLE WORTH: NEW DIRECTIONS FOR RESEARCH (Heidi I. Hartmann 
ed., 1985). 
84. The account of Heilbrun's protest is taken from Anne Matthews, Rage in a Tenured 
Position, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 8, 1992, § 6 (Magazine), at 47. 
85. Heilbrun's books include: CAROLYN G. HEILBRUN, HAMLET'S MoTHER AND OTHER 
WOMEN (1990), CAROLYN G. HEILBRUN, REINVENTING WOMANHOOD (1979), CAROLYN G. 
HEILBRUN, TOWARD A RECOGNITION OF ANDROGYNY (1973), and CAROLYN G. HEILBRUN, 
WRmNG A WoMAN's L1FE (1989). To many, Heilbrun is best known as Amanda Cross, a 
prolific mystery writer who created the character of detective Kate Fansler. See, e.g., 
AMANDA CROSS, DEATH IN A TENURED POSITION (1981); AMANDA CROSS, THE PLAYERS 
CoME AGAIN (1990). 
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Perhaps because the cultural account of workplace discrimina-
tion emphasizes ideology and deemphasizes numbers, it has been 
more attentive to discrimination against women of color and other 
people who are the minorities within minority groups. By the late 
1980s, black feminist scholars86 and lesbian theorists87 had devel-
oped a strong critique of progressive discourses, citing their failure 
to take account of diversity within minority groups. Institutions 
were charged with showcasing black men and white women as visi-
ble tokens, ignoring women of color and members of other ethnic 
and racial groups. Kimberle Crenshaw's theory of intersectionality, 
for example, asserted that the most privileged within a minority 
group - heterosexual white women, minority men - were the 
most likely to benefit from legal intervention and voluntary affirm-
ative action.88 Patricia Cain forcefully argued that the agenda of 
contemporary feminist legal schoiars often excluded lesbians and 
their experiences and concerns.89 The compound and distinctive 
nature of discrimination faced by minority women has recently 
been confirmed by a comprehensive empirical study of tenure-track 
law faculty by Deborah Merritt and Barbara Reskin.9° Their study 
concludes that in the legal academic job market, minority women 
fare less well than minority men, despite comparable credentials 
and experience. 
Although individual scholars tend to emphasize one or perhaps 
two dimensions of personal identity,91 cultural domination theory 
86. Some influential early texts include: ALL TiiE WoMEN ARE WHITE, ALL THE 
BLACKS ARE MEN, BUT SOME OF Us ARE BRAVE (Gloria T. Hull et al. eds., 1982); ANGELA 
Y. DAVIS, WOMEN, RACE & CLASS (1981); PAULA GIDDINGS, WHEN AND WHERE I ENTER: 
THE IMPACT OF BLACK WOMEN ON RACE AND SEX IN AMERICA (1984); HOME GIRLS: A 
BLACK FEMINIST ANTHOLOGY (Barbara Smith ed., 1983); BELL HOOKS, AIN'T I A WOMAN: 
BLACK WOMEN AND FEMINISM (1981); and AUDRE LORDE, SISTER OUTSIDER (1984). For an 
analysis of this body of scholarship, see p A TRICIA HILL COLLINS, BLACK FEMINIST THOUGHT 
(1990). 
87. Some widely cited texts are: SARAH L. HOAGLAND, LESBIAN ETmcs: TOWARD NEW 
VALUE (1988); Marilyn Frye, A Lesbian Perspective on Women's Studies, in LESBIAN STUD-
IES: PRESENT AND FUTURE 194 (Margaret Cruikshank ed., 1982); and Adrienne Rich, Com-
pulsory Heterosexuality and Lesbian Existence, 5 S10Ns 631 (1980). 
88. See Kimberle Crenshaw, Demarginalizing the Intersection of Race and Sex: A Black 
Feminist Critique of Antidiscrimination Doctrine, Feminist Theory and Antiracist Policies, 
1989 U. Cm. LEGAL F. 139, 152; Kimberle Crenshaw, Race, Gender, and Sexual Harassment, 
65 s. CAL. L. REV. 1467, 1467-68 (1992). 
89. See Patricia A. Cain, Feminist Jurisprudence: Grounding the Theories, 4 BERKELEY 
WOMEN'S LJ. 191 (1989). 
90. See Deborah J. Merritt & Barbara F. Reskin, The Double Minority: Empirical Evi-
dence of a Double Standard in Law School Hiring of Minority Women, 65 S. CAL. L. REv. 
2299, 2301 (1992). 
91. It is extremely difficult to pay equal attention to race, ethnicity, sex, class, sexual 
orientation, disability, and age. Even writers committed to investigating multiple oppression 
often limit their focus. For example, Bell's cultural domination theory seems to have been 
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has the potential to respond to multiple differences. The inclusive 
quality of cultural domination theory comes from the premise that 
at some point all nondominant social groups will be contained. In 
contrast to structural accounts like Kanter's, cultural domination 
theorists do not assume that the predicament of all social groups is 
fundamentally the same. They tend, instead, to acknowledge that 
the specific impact of exclusionary mechanisms on different social 
groups will inevitably differ, with some groups suffering more than 
others. The common ground is the oppressive nature of the domi· 
nant ideology - the myths that support domination of the many by 
the few. 
The cultural domination orientation goes beyond structuralist 
approaches, such as Kanter's, in seeing the social constructedness of 
the identity, not only of the outsiders or tokens in the workplace, 
but of the dominant group itself. Bell's chronicles, for example, are 
a device to allow us to see that the dominant group constructs 
myths about race and then is able to impose these illusions by polit· 
ical, legal, and other collective actions. This focus on the domi· 
nants' construction of their own cultural identity expands the 
inquiry into the relationship between knowledge and power to in· 
elude all the actors in the workplace. 
An important feature of the cultural domination orientation is 
the assumption that there are few or no limits on the ability of the 
dominant group to maintain its position. If reality depends on the 
version of reality that gets accepted, only what is unimaginable for 
those in power is off limits. This chimerical quality of culture is 
disconcerting in that it means that the Big Lie can be accepted as 
truth. It also means that progress can be undone and that there is 
no assurance that race or sex discrimination will subside, rather 
than increase. The narrative of gradual progress implicit in many of 
the structural accounts is absent in cultural domination theory. 
Cultural domination theorists, however, are not relentlessly pes· 
simistic. The chimerical quality of culture also means that there is 
constructed with the specific situation of African-American men in mind. Bell regards 
• "credentialism" - the emphasis on graduation from a prestigious law school, grades in law 
school, law review membership, and judicial clerkships - as the chief cause of tokenism on 
the Harvard law faculty and has urged that more emphasis be placed on a candidate's career 
as a distinguished teacher or practitioner. See Letter of Complaint from Derrick Bell, Weld 
Professor of Law, Harvard Law School, to Michael L. Williams, Assistant Secretary for Civil 
Rights, Office of the U.S. Department of Education (Mar. 1, 1992) (on file with author). The 
same forms of credentialism may not pose barriers for white women who face other exclu-
sionary mechanisms, such as assumptions about their Jack of geographic mobility or conflict-
ing family ties. See Deborah J. Merritt et al., Family, Place and Career: The Gender Paradox 
in Law School Hiring, 1993 Wis. L. REV. 395, 396. 
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nothing natural or inevitable about cultural beliefs and patterns. 
Even the most settled meanings can be changed, and alternative 
perspectives are possible. This is eloquently illustrated by Patricia 
Williams's response to Bell's chronicles. Williams invokes the illu-
sional quality of culture to help her understand her situation as a 
token black law professor: 
I comforted myself that my sense of alienation and now-heightened 
visibility were not inherencies of my blackness and my femaleness but 
an uncomfortable atmospheric condition afflicting everyone . 
. . . I know that my feeling of exaggerated visibility and invisibility 
are the product of my not being part of the larger cultural picture. I 
know too that the larger cultural picture is an illusion, albeit a power-
ful one, concocted from a perceptual consensus to which I am not a 
party; and that while these perceptions operate as dictators of the 
truth, they are after all merely perceptions.92 
To a greater extent than structuralists, cultural domination theo-
rists stress the importance of perspective and regard knowledge as 
situated, acknowledging the possibility of multiple truths and reali-
ties. In this respect, the cultural domination orientation, as I de-
scribe it, shares a common theme with feminist jurisprudence. The 
emphasis on perspective and the corresponding critique of objectiv-
ity and universal truth have been the hallmark of much of the femi-
nist legal scholarship of the past decade.93 Unmasking the hidden 
male viewpoint underlying seemingly neutral laws and policies has 
become a central method of feminists who claim that the law is un-
responsive to women's needs and experiences. Feminists embrac-
ing various schools of thought - whether labeled as liberal,94 
radical,95 or relational96 - agree that women's difference from men 
has been used to justify disadvantage and that the concept of differ-
ence itself needs to be unpacked and examined. 
The feminist investigation of difference has yielded two related 
insights: that the neutral concept of difference tends to obscure the 
92. Patricia Williams, A Brief Comment, with Footnotes, on the Civil Rights Chronicles, 
HARV. BLAcKLETIER J., Spring 1986, at 79, 81 n.3. 
93. For an excellent overview of the major themes and debates within feminist legal the-
ory, see Anne C. Dailey, Feminism's Return to Liberalism, 102 YALE L.J. 1265 (1993) (re-
viewing FEMINIST LEGAL THEORY (Katherine T. Bartlett & Rosanne Kennedy eds., 1991)). 
94. See, e.g., Wendy W. Williams, Equality's Riddle: Pregnancy and the Equal Treatment/ 
Special Treatment Debate, in FEMINIST LEGAL THEORY: FOUNDATIONS 128, 140 (D. Kelly 
Weisberg ed., 1993) (critiquing the male standard in the Supreme Court's treatment of preg-
nancy leave). 
95. See, e.g., CATHARINE MACKINNON, Difference and Dominance: On Sex Discrimina-
tion, in FEMINISM UNMODIFIED 32, 34 (1987) (critiquing the male standard in equal protec-
tion cases). 
96. See, e.g., CAROL GILLIGAN, IN A DIFFERENT VOICE: PSYCHOLOGICAL THEORY AND 
WOMEN'S DEVELOPMENT 1 (1982) (criticizing the male standard in psychological research). 
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power of those who are able to label others as different, and that 
even an acknowledged difference, without more, is no justification 
for unfavorable treatment. Martha Minow's scholarship97 exempli-
fies this critical approach to difference and to the connection be-
tween difference and domination. Minow argues for a relational 
concept of difference that challenges the prevailing view of differ-
ence as some intrinsic and objective quality of certain groups.98 In 
her work, Minow seeks to dislodge the oppressive meaning of dif-
ference as deviation from the norm and to question the reference 
point by which the comparison of difference is made.99 By showing 
the social constructedness of the concept of difference, Minow's 
theory contrasts sharply with motivational research that is premised 
on the search for intrinsic difference. Her focus on conceptual cate-
gories and ways of thinking also differs from the more materialist 
orientation of structuralists.100 Like Bell's, Minow's critique of dif-
ference locates discrimination in hard-to-displace habits of mind, 
unlikely to be undone by changes in the organizational chart or 
even the demographics of the organization. 
The strategies linked to the cultural domination orientation are 
less obvious than those implied by the motivational or structural 
orientation. The importance placed on ideological containment as-
sumes that piecemeal reforms, such as hiring a few more minorities 
or installing an affirmative action officer, will be co-opted by the 
dominant culture unless accompanied by a shift in the meaning of 
blackness or femaleness in the broader society. Rather than focus-
ing solely on the internal dynamics of the organization, cultural 
domination theory suggests that contradictions and myths in the 
larger culture need to be addressed and explored. The awareness 
that short-term victories can turn out to be long-term losses means 
that winning a grievance or a lawsuit may not always be the best 
strategy. The situation may instead call for consciousness-raising 
programs or cultural criticism through the mass media. Cultural 
domination theorists are more likely to believe that only sustained 
political pressure, rather than organizational self-interest, can be re-
97. The fullest elaboration of Minow's approach to difference is found in MARTHA 
MINOW, MAKING ALL THE DIFFERENCE (1990). Two important earlier articles addressing 
the same theme are Martha Minow, The Supreme Court, 1986 Term-Fonvard: Justice En· 
gendered, 101 HARV. L. REV. 10 (1987), and Martha Minow, When Difference Has Its Home, 
22 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 111 (1987). 
98. M1Now, supra note 97, at 52-53. 
99. See id. at 56-60. 
100. See id. at 3-4 (stressing that social classifications "express and implement" racism, 
sexism, and other prejudices). 
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lied upon to stimulate progressive changes. The challenge appears 
to be to devise an effective multisite strategy that calls into question 
the assumptions behind current arrangements and practices. 
My oversimplified description of both the structuralist and cul-
tural domination orientation should not be read to suggest that any 
one theorist falls squarely within one camp and one camp only. In-
stead, it is most common for critical theorists to embrace aspects of 
both structuralist and cultural theories. A particularly good exam-
ple of such a synthesis is Iris Marion Young's analysis of oppres-
sion.101 Young divides oppression into five distinctive categories: 
exploitation, marginalization, powerlessness, cultural imperialism, 
and violence and harassment. The first three categories derive from 
an analysis of workplace structures: "[W]ho works for whom, who 
does not work, and how the content of work defines one institu-
tional position relative to others."102 For example, Young describes 
workers as exploited when their energies are continuously ex-
pended to augment the status of the dominants;103 as marginalized 
when they have no place in the system;104 and as powerless when 
their work is classified as nonprofessional - lacking in autonomy 
and respectability.105 The final two categories derive from an anal-
ysis of the impact of the dominant ideology on outsider groups: 
"[H]ow the dominant meanings of a society render the particular 
perspective of one's own group invisible at the same time as they 
stereotype one's group and mark it out as the Other."106 In its most 
virulent forms, stereotyping and what Young calls "cultural imperi-
alism" can lead to systematic violence and harassment directed at 
such marked groups.101 
Young's blend of structuralist and cultural themes yields an ex-
panded conception of oppression capable of displacing narrower 
concepts of discrimination. Like many of the structuralist and cul-
tural domination theorists described above, Young's concept of op-
pression as the "primary concept for naming group-related 
injustice"108 locates the origins of patterns of segregation and 
tokenism outside the oppressed group. Her five categories of op-
101. See IRIS M. YOUNG, JUSTICE AND THE POLITICS OF DIFFERENCE (1990). 
102. Id. at 58. 
103. See id. at 48-53. 
104. See id. at 53-55. 
105. See id. at 56-58. 
106. Id. at 58-59. 
107. Id. at 62. 
108. Id. at 195. 
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pression intersect at some points with legally recognized harms, no-
tably violence, harassment, and some forms of exploitation. Not 
surprisingly, however, much of what Young classifies as injustice is 
not covered under current antidiscrimination law. The distance be-
tween Young's notion of oppression and the legal definition of dis-
crimination represents the degree to which motivational theories 
predominate in the law. 
IV. THE INFLUENCE OF STRUCTURALIST THEORIES IN THE 
COURTS 
In the courts, structuralist influence has been felt mainly in cases 
involving sexual stereotyping and sexually hostile work environ-
ments. In two major cases, Dr. Susan Fiske,109 a social psychologist 
of the Kanter school, has presented expert testimony designed to 
expand legal notions of causation and harm beyond the traditional 
motivational framework. Both cases involved the treatment of to-
ken women in male-dominated workplaces. In both cases the criti-
cal question was whether a woman's claim to discriminatory 
treatment would be judged against a comparative standard that im-
plicitly makes men's experience the measure of fair treatment in the 
workplace. Hopkins v. Price Waterhouse110 challenged the sex bias 
resulting in a negative evaluation of a professional woman by her 
male peers. Robinson v. Jacksonville Shipyards, lnc. 111 dealt with 
harassment of female blue-collar workers in a highly sexualized 
work environment. The plaintiffs won in each case, and each court 
cited Fiske's testimony as a factor influencing its decision.112 The 
structuralist orientation of Fiske's testimony, however, has not yet 
found its way securely into the legal doctrine. Instead, structuralist 
theory has been used selectively to bolster judgments for plaintiffs, 
without displacing the basic motivational framework. 
109. I have discussed the significance of Dr. Fiske's testimony at greater length in Martha 
Chamallas, Feminist Constructions of Objectivity: Multiple Perspectives in Sexual and Racial 
Harassment Litigation, 1 TEx. J. WoMEN & L. 95, 111-17, 133-35 {1992) [hereinafter Chamal-
las, Feminist Constructions of Objectivity]; and Martha Chamallas, Listening to Dr. Fiske: The 
Easy Case of Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 15 VT. L. REV. 89 (1990). 
110. 618 F. Supp. 1109 (D.D.C. 1985), affd. in part, revd. in part, 825 F.2d 458 (D.C. Cir. 
1987), affd. in part, revd. in part, 490 U.S. 228 (1989). 
111. 760 F. Supp. 1486 (M.D. Fla. 1991). 
112. See 490 U.S. at 235-36, 255-56; 760 F. Supp. at 1502-05, 1524-25. 
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A. Biased Evaluations, Causation, and Workplace Demographics: 
Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins 
Price Waterhouse involved the denial of partnership in a Big 
Eight accounting firm to a female manager who had been especially 
successful in bringing in clients and racking up billable hours.113 
The partners voted against Anne Hopkins because they did not like 
her aggressive style and unladylike personal manner; a few partners 
were incautious enough to couch their objections in explicitly 
gendered comments - for example, they claimed she was too 
"macho" and needed "a course in charm school."114 The courts 
used the occasion to refine motivational analysis in those disparate 
treatment cases in which it is clear that the plaintiff's gender influ-
enced the employer's decision to some degree. 
In individual disparate treatment cases, a standard formulation 
for determining causation is the familiar "but for" test: the inquiry 
is whether the unfavorable treatment of the plaintiff would not 
have occurred "but for" her sex.115 In practice, this often means 
that a female plaintiff must cqme forward with comparative evi-
dence of a similarly situated man who secured more favorable treat-
ment. This showing is particularly complicated when the measures 
upon which employees are judged are highly subjective: whether, 
for example, the plaintiff gets along well with others, presents her-
self well to clients, or treats subordinates decently. 
In Price Waterhouse, the causation question boiled down to 
whether Anne Hopkins was denied the partnership because of her 
lack of interpersonal skills or because she was a woman. Using 
what is known as a mixed-motivational framework, the courts tried 
to predict whether Hopkins's lack of social graces would have been 
tolerated in a man who possessed the same ability to attract clients 
and perform the technical aspects of the job.116 So framed, the 
113. Hopkins brought in more business than any other person nominated for partner that 
year, she billed the most hours, and she was well regarded by clients. 825 F.2d at 462. She 
was credited with winning a two-million-dollar contract with the Department of State. 490 
U.S. at 233-24. 
114. 490 U.S. at 235. Hopkins was advised by the partner in charge of her office that if 
she wanted to make partner she should "walk more femininely, talk more femininely, dress 
more femininely, wear make-up, have her hair styled, and wear jewelry." 490 U.S. at 235. 
115. The text of Title VII prohibits discrimination "because of" an individual's race, sex, 
and so on. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(l) (1988). The Court has made it clear that if a plaintiff 
establishes a "but-for" cause, that showing will suffice to establish liability. 490 U.S. at 240 
n.6. In mixed-motivation cases, this requirement is modified to allow the plaintiff to shoulder 
her burden by proving that sex was a "motivating factor." 490 U.S. at 250. 
116. Using the comparative standard, the district court found that Price Waterhouse did 
not engage in sex-based disparate treatment. The court rejected Hopkins's assertion that the 
firm routinely selected male partners who were deficient in personal skills, because the court 
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comparative question led to a search for the true or objective as-
sessment of the plaintiff's personality: Was Hopkins really as ob-
noxious as some of the partners said she was, or were their views 
tainted by gender bias? Was the denial of the partnership caused 
by Hopkins's personality, or was it the product of the partners' prej-
udice against women? 
Under the motivational framework, there are only two possible 
sources for a plaintiff's disadvantage; the harm is caused either by 
the plaintiff's deficiencies or by the intentionally biased attitudes of 
the evaluators. This dichotomous conceptualization of causation 
leaves little room to consider how structural features may affect the 
way a plaintiff's personality and performance is perceived by others 
in the workplace. The motivational framework does not focus di-
rectly on the dynamics of tokenism because it presumes that the 
structural position of male and female workers in skewed working 
groups is the same. 
In contrast to the motivational approach, Fiske's structural anal-
ysis assumed that Hopkins's status as a token woman was of para-
mount importance.117 In her testimony, Fiske explained that when 
women are dramatically underrepresented in organizations, they 
are especially vulnerable to stereotyping and typecasting.us Based 
on her review of the partners' comments, Fiske concluded that it 
was likely that Hopkins was scrutinized more closely than her male 
peers on nonperformance measures often associated with women. 
Fiske believed that once Hopkins was cast as an "iron maiden," this 
image might have obscured those aspects of her personality that did 
not fit the preconceived mold.119 
Fiske's analysis cast doubt on the neutrality of the partners' 
view that Hopkins was overbearing and aggressive. Even those 
partners who thought they were being fair and objective were likely 
influenced by the skewed demographics of the workplace. In the 
structuralist account, the skewed workplace can distort the token's 
personality. The cause of the distortion is an imbalanced work-
place, reinforced by management's failure to discourage stereotyp-
ing and typecasting. 
found no sufficiently comparable case. Hopkins v. Price Waterhouse, 618 F. Supp. 1109, 
1115-16 (D.D.C. 1985). The court ruled in favor of Hopkins, however, because Price 
Waterhouse had given weight to stereotyped comments in its evaluation of Hopkins. 618 F. 
Supp. at 1120. 
117. Trial Testimony of Dr. Susan Fiske, Record at 28, Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 
U.S. 228 {1989) (No. 87-1167) [hereinafter Trial Testimony]. 
118. Id. at 26-27. 
119. Id. at 31. 
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The structuralist account is not as male-focused as the compara-
tive standard used in motivational analysis. Structuralist theory as-
sumes that perceptions are influenced by group status. Because of 
this structural difference, it is not enough to imagine how any given 
individual might have been treated if she had been a member of the 
other group, without also taking into account the difference that 
group membership makes. Fiske, for example, did not set out to 
answer the question of whether Hopkins would have fared better as 
a man. Even if the partners would also have objected to an over-
bearing and aggressive man - a highly debatable judgment -
Fiske would not have regarded the evaluation of Hopkins as com-
parable because there was no reliable way to separate Hopkins's 
status as a token woman from the partners' subjective assessment of 
her personality. 
The comparative standard in motivational analysis presupposes 
that a judge can discover whether there are salient differences 
about the person being judged - besides a difference in gender -
that might justify treating her unfavorably. The question is ap-
proached simply as a question of fact. The structuralist account as-
sumes that differences are socially constructed and shifts the focus 
from the factual inquiry about whether difference exists to an in-
quiry into how perceptions of difference originate and are main-
tained. Causation in the structuralist account is complicated by the 
assumption that a token's personality is shaped and sometimes dis-
torted by her outsider status in the workplace. Under Fiske's analy-
sis, even those partners who did not employ explicitly gendered 
statements to evaluate Hopkins's , performance might be said to 
have judged her "as a woman," rather than in a truly gender-neutral 
fashion. 
The Supreme Court in Price Waterhouse did not rely on Fiske's 
testimony to disavow the comparative, motivational approach but 
instead used it to refine the burden of proof in mixed-motivation 
cases. The crucial test remains whether a plaintiff would have been 
treated more favorably if she were a man. The burden shifts to the 
employer to prove lack of causation only in those instances in which 
the plaintiff produces direct evidence that sexism or sexual stere-
otyping was a "motivating factor" in the adverse decision.120 
120. 490 U.S. at 250. The Civil Rights Act of 1991 modified the holding in Price 
Waterhouse to make the defendant liable for attorney's fees and injunctive relief, 42 U.S.C. 
§ 2000e-5(g){2){B)(i) (Supp. IV 1992), whenever the plaintiff proves that sex was a motivat-
ing factor in its decision. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(m) (Supp. IV 1992). The defendant may pro-
tect itself from monetary damages - for example, back pay, compensatory, or punitive 
damages - and reinstatement if it proves lack of causation, that is, that the same decision 
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Unlike the holding in Price Waterhouse, a doctrine fashioned 
along structuralist lines would not turn on whether the plaintiff 
could adduce some direct evidence of sex-based motivation. In-
stead, I interpret the structuralist approach as implying that em-
ployers should be responsible for counteracting the dynamics of 
tokenism if they wish to rely on subjective assessments of employee 
performance. I imagine that under a structuralist approach the 
plaintiff's prima facie case would consist of a showing of dramatic 
underrepresentation of the plaintiff's group, satisfactory perform-
ance by the plaintiff on objective measures, and evidence of a sub-
jective, largely standardless selection process. In such a case, an 
employer would be held liable unless it could show that it had taken 
adequate measures to guard against stereotyping. For example, 
employers might avoid liability by giving decisionmaking authority 
to a sexually integrated group or by instituting a structured evalua-
tion process that specified as precisely as possible the criteria to be 
used in making the decision. 
As I envision it, to give rise to a presumption of discrimination, 
a structuralist approach would not require the kind of "smoking 
gun" evidence adduced by Hopkins. The partners at Price 
Waterhouse may not have been circumspect in stating their views, 
because the Court had only recently subjected partnership decisions 
to Title VII scrutiny.121 In most contemporary cases, we can expect 
discrimination to be more subtle. The structuralist approach as-
sumes that dramatic gender imbalance in the workplace gives rise 
to gender inequity through stereotyped judgments and nonneutral 
evaluations, albeit couched in neutral language. If such an ap-
proach informed Title VII, employers would have a much greater 
incentive to hire and promote women in nontraditional jobs. It 
would not be sufficient merely to discourage supervisors from mak-
ing explicitly sex-based comments during the evaluation process. 
B. Reconceiving Legal Injury: Robinson v. Jacksonville 
Shipyards, Inc. 
The second way structuralism has influenced Title VII litigation 
involves the important question of what counts as legally cognizable 
harm. More than other types of claims, suits for sexually hostile 
work environments highlight the extent to which the basic concept 
of injury itself is derived from the experience of the dominant 
would have been made "in the absence of the impermissible factor." 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-
5(g)(2)(B)(ii) (Supp. IV 1992). 
121. See Hishon v. King & Spaulding, 467 U.S. 69 {1984). 
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group. The type of sexual harassment first recognized by the courts 
- the claim for quid pro quo harassment - was easily assimilated 
to an injury that could also be experienced by men. Quid pro quo 
harassment most often takes the form of employer retaliation 
against a plaintiff for refusing to comply with sexual demands.122 A 
woman who is fired for refusing to sleep with the boss, for example, 
has suffered the kind of tangible economic harm that is not so dif-
ferent from the harm a man might suffer if he stood up to the un-
reasonable demands of his boss. When the claim is that of a 
sexually hostile environment,123 however, it is more difficult to see 
the injury suffered by women as analogous to what happens to men 
in the workplace. 
Robinson124 presents a classic instance of the conflict that arises 
when a small number of women integrate an intensely male-domi-
nated workplace. At the Jacksonville shipyards, sexualized images 
of women were so commonplace that they went unnoticed. Porno-
graphic photographs and plaques hung on the walls, and vendors 
routinely distributed advertising calendars with "pinups" to em-
ployees.125 The management and the male workers believed that it 
was their right126 and part of their tradition to display this mate-
rial,127 even though several of the pictures very explicitly demeaned 
women and women's bodies.128 The female employees were sub-
jected to repeated verbal abuse and humiliation.129 The conflict es-
calated when plaintiff pressed her objection to the displays. She 
122. The EEOC guidelines provide for liability in quid pro quo cases when "submission 
to such conduct is made either explicitly or implicitly a term or condition of an individual's 
employment [or] is used as the basis for employment decisions affecting such individual." 29 
C.F.R. § 1604.ll(a)(l)-(2) (1993). 
123. Offensive working environment occurs when the harassing conduct of a supervisor, 
coemployee, or third party - for example, a customer or client - "has the purpose or effect 
of unreasonably interfering with an individual's work performance or creating an intimidat-
ing, hostile, or offensive working environment." 29 C.F.R. § 1604.ll(a)(3) (1993). 
124. Robinson v. Jacksonville Shipyards, Inc., 760 F. Supp. 1486 (M.D. Fla. 1991). 
Women constituted less than five percent of the skilled workforce at the shipyards. 760 F. 
Supp. at 1493. 
125. 760 F. Supp. at 1493. 
126. 760 F. Supp. at 1515. 
127. Supervisors claimed that it was a" 'natural thing'" to have sexual pictures in a ship-
yard, because "nautical people always had displayed pinups and other images of nude or 
partially nude women, like figureheads on boats." 760 F. Supp. at 1516. 
128. For example, there was a picture of a woman's pubic area with a meat spatula 
pressed on it, 760 F. Supp. at 1495, and a dart board with a drawing of a woman's breast with 
the nipple serving as the bull's eye, 760 F. Supp. at 1497. 
129. 760 F. Supp. at 1498-501. 
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was then singled out for retaliatory harassment, and the porno-
graphic displays intensified.130 
From the vantage point of the men who dominated the work-
place, the women employees brought the injury upon themselves, if 
it could be said that they suffered injury at all. The supervisors min-
imized the problem, treated the women who complained as lacking 
in credibility, and generally failed to prevent even repeat offenders 
from continuing the abuse.131 
One important issue in Robinson was whether behavior that did 
not target a specific individual, particularly the pornographic dis-
plays, should be held to constitute a legal injury. The plaintiffs had 
to articulate why material that was innocuous and even pleasurable 
for the men was injurious to the women. Then they faced the fur-
ther challenge of demonstrating to the court why their discomfort 
with the pornography amounted to employment discrimination. 
Fiske's structuralist account of pornography's effect on the sta-
tus of the women as token employees provided this important link. 
As in Price Waterhouse, Fiske started her analysis by explaining 
how the dramatic sexual imbalance at the shipyards was a precondi-
tion for a form of stereotyping known as " 'sex role spillover,' " or 
the tendency to regard women in terms of their sexuality and their 
worth as sex objects, rather than as competent co-workers.132 Fiske 
theorized that the presence of pornography at the worksite set in 
motion a process called "priming,'' which encouraged men to think 
about women in categorical, sexually objectified terms.133 Because 
men controlled all the positions of power at the shipyards, Fiske 
also noted that women were powerless to have their complaints 
taken seriously.134 Fiske cited research explaining that a common 
response to an outsider's complaint of injustice is to treat the out-
sider as the source of the problem, rather than to scrutinize the 
dominant group's behavior.135 Fiske thus was able to show how the 
demographics of the workplace affected the grievance process and 
made it unlikely that the men's behavior would easily be checked. 
Fiske's structuralist account of the harassment at the Jackson-
ville shipyards stressed how harassment functioned as a tool of ex-
clusion - a device to keep down the number of women in skilled 
130. 760 F. Supp. at 1500-01. 
131. 760 F. Supp. at 1531-32. 
132. 760 F. Supp. at 1503. 
133. 760 F. Supp. at 1503. 
134. 760 F. Supp. at 1504. 
135. 760 F. Supp. at 1504. 
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jobs and to retard their advancement on the job. Like the scholar-
ship of Schultz and Arriola, Fiske's testimony in Robinson uncov-
ered the job-related consequences of a sexually hostile 
environment. Fiske was able to recast the injury to the plaintiffs as 
economic and systemic, rather than as personal and intangible. So 
deployed, structuralist theory described a gender-specific injury: 
sexual material that posed no problem for male employees could 
nevertheless harm the employment status of token women. In the 
structuralist view, the sexually oriented nature of the material could 
not be judged in isolation from its use in the particular work setting. 
The nondominant position of the women was underlined and exac-
erbated by the sexualized, nonprofessional ambience that pervaded 
the shipyards.136 Fiske described sexual harassment in structuralist 
terms: for her, it was both produced by and sustained by tokenism. 
The district court's ruling in Robinson embraced structuralist 
theory to a greater degree than did the courts in Price Waterhouse. 
The court held that Fiske's testimony "provided a sound, credible 
theoretical framework from which to conclude that the presence of 
pictures of nude and partially nude women, sexual comments, sex-
ual joking, and other behaviors previously described creates and 
contributes to a sexually hostile work environment."137 This hold-
ing in Robinson made clear that gender baiting and sexual denigra-
tion, as well as sexual propositioning, were actionable forms of 
sexual harassment. Moreover, the structuralist account of the 
harmful effects of harassment on the status of token women justi-
fied holding the employer liable, although much of the sexual mate-
rial had not been displayed for the purpose of harming women and 
had predated the entry of women in the workplace. The court's 
holding made explicit what is implicit in structuralist theory: that 
employers have the responsibility to change the prevailing tone of 
the workplace to make it hospitable to newcomers. The court also 
accepted Fiske's testimony as a "reliable basis" for concluding that 
a "reasonable woman" would be harmed by the sexually hostile en-
vironment,138 thus employing structuralist theory to validate the 
plaintiff's subjective claim of injury. 
It is still too early to predict the long-term impact of Robinson 
on Title VII doctrine. The case seems to have helped establish that 
gender baiting in male-dominated workplaces is a category of sex-
136. 760 F. Supp. at 1505. 
137. 760 F. Supp. at 1505. 
138. 760 F. Supp. at 1524. 
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ual harassment.1s9 The aspect of the case dealing with the legal sta-
tus of pornography in the workplace is less secure. Critics have 
charged that the court's ruling violates the First Amendment and 
that only targeted harassment should be actionable under Title 
VII.14o Most importantly, beyond accepting Fiske's expert assess-
ment in the specific case, it is not clear how Robinson alters the 
legal doctrine in hostile environment cases. 
I would argue that a doctrine fashioned along structuralist lines 
should more generally incorporate Fiske's observations into the 
substantive law. If structuralist assumptions informed the legal con-
cept of discrimination, it would not be necessary for plaintiff to pro-
duce an expert witness to connect the display of pornography to the 
existence of a sexually hostile environment, at least in those con-
texts in which women lacked control over the physical spaces in 
their workplace. If Title VII were grounded in structuralist theory, 
plaintiffs would be entitled to a jury instruction to the effect that the 
sexualization of the workplace imposes a greater burden on women 
than on men. The fact that the pornography was not specifically 
targeted at an individual female employee would not be seen as 
lessening its capacity to cause harm. In Robinson, the court chose 
to accept Fiske's theory as a validation of the particular plaintiff's 
injury. Fiske's theory, however, can be applied more generally to 
predict that the display of pornography and the toleration of sexual-
ized behavior will have the effect of discrediting token women in 
male-dominated workplaces. Structuralist theory was used in 
Robinson to educate and persuade a particular fact finder. Its use 
could be extended to shape the general contours of the hostile envi-
ronment claim. 
V. CULTURAL DOMINATION THEORY AND THE VICTIM 
PERSPECTIVE 
Cultural domination theory has found its way into Title VII 
through the debate on perspective that is currently occurring in sex-
ual and racial harassment litigation.141 One element of proof in 
139. The proposed EEOC guidelines on harassment now explicitly state that gender-
based, but nonsexual, harassment violates Title VII's ban on sex discrimination. Guidelines 
on Harassment Based on Race, Color, Religion, Gender, National Origin, Age, or Disability, 
58 Fed. Reg. 51,266, 51,267 n.2 (1993) (to be codified at 29 C.F.R. § 1609) (proposed Oct. 1, 
1993) [hereinafter EEOC Guidelines on Harassment]. 
140. See Kingsley R. Browne, Title VII as Censorship: Hostile-Environment Harassment 
and the First Amendment, 52 OHIO ST. L.J. 481 (1991). 
141. For discussions of perspective, see Kathryn Abrams, Gender Discrimination and the 
Transformation of Workplace Norms, 42 V AND. L. Rev. 1183 (1989); Naomi R. Cahn, The 
Looseness of Legal Language: The Reasonable Woman Standard in Theory and in Practice, 
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hostile or offensive environment cases is a showing that the harass-
ment suffered by the plaintiff is sufficiently "severe or pervasive" to 
alter the conditions of her employment.142 This requirement means 
that the plaintiff must convince the judge or jury143 that the harass-
ment was not isolated or trivial and that it warrants federal judicial 
intervention. 
Increasingly, courts have begun to recognize the importance of 
perspective in determining what counts as offensive conduct and 
how much offensive conduct plaintiffs will be required to endure 
before they have a valid claim. In a few notable cases, courts have 
cited feminist and critical race scholars for the proposition that the 
harm of discrimination ought to be judged from the perspective of 
those experiencing the discrimination.144 This embrace of the vic-
tim's perspective fits with cultural domination theory insofar as it 
provides a legal method for resisting the dominant or prevailing 
workplace ideologies. It also allows nondominant groups to contest 
the meaning and significance of everyday acts that cumulatively re-
inforce their position of inferiority. 
The debate about perspective has been most intense in sexual 
harassment cases but has also surfaced in racial harassment cases.145 
At one level, the issue is whether to modify the formulation of the 
applicable test to reflect the gender or race of the plaintiff. A burn-
ing question, for example, has been whether the severity and perva-
siveness of harassment should be judged by what a reasonable 
person or reasonable woman would find objectionable. The deeper 
question, however, is how thoroughly the law will accept that work-
77 CORNELL L. REV. 1398 (1992); Martha Chamallas, Writing About Sexual Harassment: A 
Guide to the Literature, 4 UCLA WOMEN'S LJ. 37, 49-52 (1993); and Jane L. Dolkart, Hostile 
Environment Harassment: Equality, Objectivity, and the Shaping of Legal Standards, 43 EM-
ORY L.J. 151 (1994). 
142. Meritor Sav. Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 67 (1986). 
143. The Civil Rights Act of 1991 authorizes jury trials for cases of intentional discrimina-
tion in which a party seeks compensatory or punitive damages. 42 U.S.C. § 1981a(c) (Supp. 
IV 1992). 
144. See Ellison v. Brady, 924 F.2d 872, 878-79 (9th Cir. 1991) (citing Kathryn Abrams 
and Nancy Ehrenreich); Harris v. International Paper Co., 765 F. Supp. 1509, 1515-16 & n.12 
(D. Me.), modified, 765 F. Supp. 1529 (D. Me. 1991) (citing Charles Lawrence, Mari 
Matsuda, Derrick Bell, Patricia Williams, and Judith Scales-Trent); Lehmann v. Toys 'R' Us, 
Inc., 626 A.2d 445 (NJ. 1993) (citing Kathryn Abrams and Barbara Gutek); cf. Daniels v. 
Essex Group, Inc., 937 F.2d 1264, 1273 n.3 (7th Cir. 1991) (citing Mari Matsuda but retaining 
a reasonable person standard); Rodgers v. Western-Southern Life Ins. Co., 792 F. Supp. 628, 
635 (E.D. Wis. 1992), affd., 12 F.3d 668 (7th Cir. 1993) (noting the viewpoint of reasonable 
black employee). 
145. For a more extensive discussion of the use of modified objective standards in racial 
harassment cases, see Chamallas, Feminist Constructions of Objectivity, supra note 109, at 
117-22, 137-42. 
2404 Michigan Law Review (Vol. 92:2370 
place norms are often not the result of consensus or a fair balancing 
of interests but instead a reflection of the ability of the dominant 
group to shape the tone and culture of the workplace. 
Prior to the Supreme Court's recent ruling in Harris v. Forklift 
Systems, Inc., 146 the battle over perspective centered on two influ-
ential precedents representing the conservative and progressive ap-
proaches to hostile work environment litigation. On the 
conservative side was Rabidue v. Osceola Refining Co., 147 a case 
involving a token woman who was subjected to verbal abuse by her 
supervisor.148 The refinery was a highly sexualized worksite in 
which pornography was openly displayed in common areas.149 Ap-
plying the reasonable person test, the majority of the Sixth Circuit 
panel found no Title VII violation.150 The court based its judgment 
on the belief that society condoned graphic sexual depictions in the 
mass media,151 including prime-time TV, and that a woman such as 
the plaintiff assumed the risk when she accepted a job at such a 
male-dominated workplace.152 Rabidue soon generated a volume 
of feminist commentary aimed at exposing the implicit male bias 
underlying the reasonable person standard and articulating the 
harms of the sexualized workplace from the perspective of women 
employees.153 
On the progressive end was Ellison v. Brady, 154 the most promi-
nent decision to embrace the reasonable woman standard. Ellison 
involved a claim of harassment by a woman who became the target 
of a co-worker's romantic delusions. The plaintiff felt threatened 
by the pursuit because the man seemed oblivious to her lack of in-
terest in him and ignored her requests to stop.155 The defendant 
argued that the pursuit was harmless and noncoercive.156 In ruling 
146. 114 S. Ct. 367 (1993). 
147. 805 F.2d 611 (6th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 481 U.S. 1041 {1987). 
148. One of the male supervisors "routinely referred to women as 'whores,' 'cunt,' 
'pussy,' and 'tits.'" 805 F.2d at 624 (Keith, J., dissenting). 
149. 805 F.2d at 623-34 (Keith, J., dissenting). 
150. 805 F.2d at 619-20. In a dissent that later was widely cited, Judge Keith argued for 
application of the "reasonable woman" standard. 805 F.2d at 626 (Keith, J., dissenting). 
151. 805 F.2d at 622. 
152. 805 F.2d at 620. 
153. See, e.g., Abrams, supra note 141; Nancy S. Ehrenreich, Pluralist Myths and Power-
less Men: The Ideology of Reasonableness in Sexual Harassment Law, 99 YALE L.J. 1177, 
1214-32 (1990); Lucinda M. Finley, A Breqk in the Silence: Including Women's Issues in a 
Torts Course, 1 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 41, 60-62 {1989). 
154. 924 F.2d 872 (9th Cir. 1991). 
155. 924 F.2d at 874. 
156. The district court accepted the defendant's characterization of the case and regarded 
the events as " 'isolated and genuinely trivial.' " 924 F.2d at 876. 
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for the plaintiff, the appellate court drew upon feminist commen-
tary emphasizing that women's definition of coercion might differ 
from men's because of women's greater exposure to sexual vio-
lence.151 The court also stressed that reasonable women have good 
reason to regard sexual conduct at work as a threat to maintaining 
their precarious hold as serious professionals.158 
The Supreme Court in Harris has recently used reasonable per-
son language to describe the appropriate test in hostile-environ-
ment cases. Without elaboration, the Court noted that "[c]onduct 
that is not severe or pervasive enough to create an objectively hos-
tile or abusive work environment - an environment that a reason-
able person would find hostile or abusive - is beyond Title VII's 
purview."159 This apparent endorsement of the reasonable person 
standard, however, does not mean that the Court approved of the 
conservative approach of Rabidue. In fact, on another point, the 
Court criticized Rabidue and cited Ellison approvingly.160 
The perspective debate will now center on the significance and 
meaning of the Harris dicta. Even before Harris, the EEOC took a 
middle position that might well turn out to be the position of the 
Court. The EEOC disavowed the judgment in Rabidue about the 
harmlessness of pornography in the workplace161 but chose to re-
tain the reasonable person standard.162 The agency cautioned, how-
ever, that the reasonable person standard "should not be applied in 
a vacuum," and that "[t]he reasonable person standard should con-
sider the victim's perspective and not stereotyped notions of accept-
able behavior."163 Most recently, the EEOC has elaborated upon 
what it means by application of the reasonable person standard and 
has expressed the view that "consideration is to be given to the per-
spective of individuals of the claimant's race, color, religion, gender, 
national origin, age, or disability."164 
157. 924 F.2d at 879 n.9 (citing Abrams, supra note 141, at 1205). 
158. 924 F.2d at 878-79. 
159. Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 114 S. Ct. 367, 370 (1993). 
160. The Court rejected Rabidue's holding that Title VII plaintiffs be required to prove 
that they suffered severe psychological injury, adopting the Ellison view that such showing of 
damage was not necessary. 114 S. Ct. at 370. 
161. EEOC Policy Guidance on Sexual Harassment, Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. 201, at 
E-4 (Oct. 18, 1988) (stating that "the Commission believes that a workplace in which sexual 
slurs, displays of 'girlie' pictures, and other offensive conduct abound can constitute a hostile 
work environment even if many people deem it to be harmless or insignificant"). 
162. Id. 
163. Id. 
164. EEOC Guidelines on Harassment, supra note 139, at 51,267. 
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One interpretation of Harris and the EEOC's position is that 
the victim's perspective has been recognized as valid and entitled to 
be articulated and taken into account by the jury. What is unset-
tled, however, is what showing might be sufficient to convince a 
jury that the victim's view of events differs from the view that 
would be taken by a "reasonable person." It is also unclear as to 
whether a plaintiff is entitled to have the jury instructed that the 
appropriate standard is a modified one - that is, a standard ex-
pressed in terms of a reasonable person of the plaintiff's sex or 
race. If such a modified standard is ultimately authorized by the 
courts, then the apparent endorsement of the reasonable person 
test in Harris will ironically amount to an approval of Ellison and a 
repudiation of Rabidue. 
It is also possible, of course, that the Court will ultimately reject 
the EEOC position and rule that the sex or race of the plaintiff 
should have no bearing on the jury's assessment of reasonableness. 
Harris leaves the question of perspective open.165 The Court seems 
committed to a concept of reasonableness or objectivity but has not 
yet spoken on whether reasonableness can be recast to account for 
perspectives of nondominant groups. 
Regardless of the precise formulation of the test, the critical is-
sue for the future will be the willingness of courts and juries to em-
brace the victim's perspective in assessing whether harm has 
occurred and the degree of harm sustained. Consideration of the 
victim's perspective can encourage the fact finder to look at the in-
cidents in the workplace in light of the specific history of discrimi-
nation suffered by the nondominant group. In one recent case,166 
for example, a court explained why the mention of the KKK 
through graffiti in the workplace would have an intimidating effect 
on blacks. It articulated how even one incident drawing upon this 
image, such as performing a KKK ritual in the workplace, might 
suffice to create a hostile work environment for black employees.167 
Consideration of the victim's perspective also makes it more dif-
ficult to dismiss or trivialize taunts, nicknames, and epithets as 
pranks or jokes. In recent cases, for example, courts acknowledged 
the demeaning quality of the nickname Buckwheat as applied to 
black employees and stated that use of the term nigger, even if not 
directed at the plaintiff, contributes to a hostile environment be-
165. The Court stated that it was not addressing the EEOC's regulations in its opinion. 
Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 114 S. Ct. 367, 371 (1993). 
166. Daniels v. Essex Group, Inc., 937 F.2d 1264 (7th Cir. 1991). 
167. 937 F.2d at 1274 n.4. 
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cause it shows a lack of respect for blacks.168 This long-overdue 
recognition of the cruelty behind such v~rbal taunts may seem un-
remarkable. What is significant, however, is the growing accept-
ance of the view that this kind of everyday abuse can "corrode the 
entire employment relationship"169 and ultimately reinforce the ra-
cial and sexual hierarchy in the workplace. 
In cases involving forms of cultural domination other than vio-
lence and harassment, however, cultural domination theory has 
been less influential in the courts. When the challenge is to a spe-
cific work rule, rather than an overall claim of a hostile working 
environment, the courts tend to reject the victim perspective. Per-
haps the most dramatic example of the continuing impact of moti-
vational theory on the law can be seen in cases upholding English-
only rules in the workplace.17° These cases typically forbid bilin-
gual employees from communicating during working time with co-
employees in a language other than English.171 Employers have 
not been able to articulate a concrete business justification for the 
English-only rules and have been reduced to arguing that the use of 
languages other than English "unnerves" supervisors and makes 
monolingual employees fearful that they are being ridiculed by 
their colleagues.172 These are not cases in which the use of Spanish 
or some other foreign language would reduce efficiency or in any 
other way interfere with the service performed by the employees. 
Instead, at issue is a contest over the prevailing culture of the work-
place: Does the employer have the right to preserve the Anglo 
character of the business even when the employees do not fit the 
Anglo image? 
From the perspective of Latino employees who have challenged 
these bans, English-only rules are a manifestation of cultural domi-
nation. The plaintiffs have argued that denying them the right to 
speak Spanish on the job denies them a right of cultural expression 
168. Rodgers v. Western-Southern Life Ins. Co., 792 F. Supp. 628, 635 (E.D. Wis. 1992), 
affd., 12 F.3d 668 (7th Cir. 1993); Daniels, 937 F.2d at 1264; Harris v. International Paper Co., 
765 F. Supp. 1509 (D. Me.), modified, 765 F. Supp. 1529 (D. Me. 1991). 
169. EEOC Guidelines on Harassment, supra note 139, at 51,267. 
170. See, e.g., Garcia v. Spun Steak Co., 998 F.2d 1480 (9th Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 114 S. 
Ct. 2726 (1994); Garcia v. Gloor, 618 F.2d 264 (5th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1113 
(1981). But see Gutierrez v. Municipal Court, 838 F.2d 1031 (9th Cir. 1988) (affirming entry 
of a preliminary iµjunction against enforcement of an English-only rule), vacated as moot, 
490 U.S. 1016 (1989). 
171. The bans, however, generally have not covered lunch, breaks, or other personal 
time. See, e.g., 998 F.2d at 1483; 838 F.2d at 1037. The EEOC has taken the position that 
blanket prohibitions are presumptively invalid. 29 C.F.R. § 1606.7(a) (1993). 
172. See 838 F.2d at 1042. 
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- a right that is accorded to English-speaking employees.173 Citing 
the hostile environment cases, the plaintiffs have also argued that 
the effect of English-only rules is to create an "atmosphere of infer-
iority, isolation and intimidation."174 The claim is straightforward 
and antiassimilationist: to be forced to suppress one's cultural iden-
tity to suit the image of the business is insulting an.d demeaning. 
Except for one opinion that was ultimately vacated as moot,11s 
plaintiffs have not succeeded in persuading the courts to view the 
English-only rules from the victim's perspective. Instead the courts 
have applied motivational analysis to uphold the rules as a reason-
able exercise of management prerogative.176 The motivational ar-
gument starts from the premise that because a bilingual employee is 
capable of speaking English, he or she exercises a choice when de-
ciding which language to use at work.177 The courts have deter-
mined that bilingual employees forced to speak English are not 
disadvantaged because they "can readily comply with the English-
only rule and still enjoy the privilege of speaking on the job."178 In 
the motivational analysis, it is the employee's preference not to as-
similate that causes the harm. Those persons fired for failing to 
conform are regarded as casualties of their own choices rather than 
victims of an exclusionary workplace culture. 
Clearly, if the cultural domination approach were to gain 
greater acceptance in Title VII litigation, workplace rules such as 
English-only requirements would be unlawful because they primar-
ily function as cultural markers of exclusion and hierarchy. Cur-
rently, the law permits nondominant groups a cause of action only 
in extreme cases in which the exclusionary behavior of supervisors 
and co-workers is so intolerable as to amount to pervasive and se-
vere harassment. This limited protection against cultural domina-
tion falls short of a right to have one's cultural identity affirmed and 
recognized as valuable and equal. The victim's perspective is ac-
knowledged only sporadically and has yet to secure solid footing in 
Title VII law. 
173. 998 F.2d at 1487; 838 F.2d at 1039; 618 F.2d at 268. 
174. 998 F.2d at 1488; 838 F.2d at 1040. 
175. 838 F.2d 1031. 
176. See, e.g., 998 F.2d at 1487; 618 F.2d at 268-70. 
177. See 998 F.2d at 1487; 618 F.2d at 270. 
178. 998 F.2d at 1487; see also 618 F.2d at 270. 
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VI. POSTSCRIPT 
In the past thirty years, Title VII has become an increasingly 
technical and complex piece of legislation. The 1991 amendments 
in particular codified and refined the doctrine in both disparate 
treatment and disparate impact cases in an elaborate attempt to re-
store protections and confine judicial discretion. Significantly, how-
ever, the legislation still contains no definition of discrimination. 
There remains ample room for litigants, courts, and juries to shape 
the meaning of discrimination and workplace equality. 
In this essay I have attempted to illustrate how greater accept-
ance of structuralist and cultural domination theories might help 
Title VII work to change resilient patterns of tokenism and segrega-
tion. These observations reveal no simple formula for progress, 
however. In the 1990s, critical theorists have confronted the pessi-
mism and despair that results when the vast dimensions of a prob-
lem are realized. One response has been to emphasize strategy, to 
recognize that no single theory or set of theories will be sufficient to 
address "the varied, multiple and compound inequalities"179 facing 
nondominant groups. Each of the three orientations I have identi-
fied, including the motivational approach, can be effective strate-
gies to challenge entrenched hierarchies in contemporary 
institutions and organizations. In most instances, however, I be-
lieve that structuralist and cultural domination theories more read-
ily provide a theoretical foundation for remedying group-based 
harm and for developing new standards of inclusion that can diver-
sify the workplace culture. 
179. Diana Majury, Strategizing in Equality, in AT THE BOUNDARIES OF LAw: FEMINISM 
AND LEGAL THEORY 320, 330 (Martha A. Fineman & Nancy S. Thomadsen eds., 1991). 
